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A French Imperial Meridian, 1814–1870 
 
I 
The period stretching from the restoration of Louis XVIII in 1814 until the fall of 
Napoleon III in 1870 remains the terra incognita of the history of French global 
ambitions. Even the volume of L‘Aventure coloniale de la France covering the years 
1789–1870 stresses that the French ‗cautiously withdrew into themselves‘ after the 
collapse of the first Napoleonic Empire.
i
 Such a view, this article argues, relies on an 
extraordinary neglect for the resilience of French formal and, above all, informal power 
between the fall of the Bourbon monarchy‘s Atlantic empire and the rise of the Third 
Republic‘s African and Indochinese empire: France in the intervening years remained a 
military, economic, scientific, and cultural superpower, who deployed her influence on a 
global scale, and not always unsuccessfully. It is therefore possible to recast the years 
1814 to 1870 as a French ‗imperial meridian‘, in the sense of an historiographical chasm 
between two classical periods of imperial expansion.  
The British imperial meridian identified by Christopher Bayly referred to a phase 
of authoritarian rule combined with the forceful imposition of modern economic 
institutions on Britain‘s imperial possessions between 1780 and 1830, a policy facilitated 
by the contemporary crises of the Ottoman, Persian and Mughal empires. His analysis 
entailed a radical revision of earlier interpretations of the transition from Britain‘s first 
‗predatory‘ empire in the Americas to a second ‗developmental‘ empire in Asia and 
Africa.
ii
 The French imperial meridian does not have the same ideological coherence as 
Bayly‘s. As befits an age of ‗flux and hiatus‘ in global history, French imperial policies 
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were often hesitant.
iii
 But a reappraisal of French global ambitions during this period 
offers new insights on French imperialism from the eighteenth to the twentieth century 
and its relation to European overseas expansionism in the nineteenth century. This 
section argues that overlooking French projects of global expansion between 1814 and 
1870 has established a false sense of discontinuity between the first and second French 
colonial empires, and points to the gradual adoption of a policy of collaboration with 
Britain, to preserve and enhance France‘s stake in the exploitation of the extra-European 
world, as a key neglected feature of the period. The second and third sections will test 
these hypotheses: they will examine, respectively, the revival and survival of the French 
‗old colonial system‘ from 1814 to 1848, and the search for new means of spreading 
French influence, including the global defence of Catholicism and free trade, between 
1848 and 1870.  
Most recent syntheses on the history of French imperialism are based on the 
assumption that the Revolutionary and Napoleonic years marked an abrupt and 
fundamental break.
iv
 The First French colonial empire collapsed, the narrative goes, and 
post-Revolutionary France gradually reconstituted a new empire, a linear process which 
culminated with the Third Republic.
v
 Apart from such syntheses, classical works tend to 
focus on two distinct moments, ‗successful‘ or dramatic, of French imperial history: the 
prosperity of the French West Indies in the late eighteenth century and the Haitian 
revolution on the one hand, and the republican mission civilisatrice and decolonization on 
the other.
vi
 Anglophone historians have been making increasingly important contributions 
to the field, while the recent revival of interest among francophone historians in the 
republican empire is largely fuelled by domestic political controversies about 
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immigration — a connection which came to the fore when the French National Assembly 
adopted an amendment prescribing that history textbooks acknowledge ‗the positive role 
of French presence overseas, especially in North Africa‘ in February 2005.vii Even 
valuable works on the intermediate period suffer from a pronounced regional (Algeria, 
the Pacific Ocean) or temporal (the second abolition of slavery) focus.
viii
 The last 
comprehensive analysis of French colonial policy between 1814 and 1870 dates back to 
Christian Schefer‘s stringently pro-colonial works in the early twentieth century.ix   
Why such a prolonged neglect for the history of French imperial ambitions in this 
period? A practical factor is the limited accessibility of official archives, in contrast with 
the well-catalogued colonial archives from the early modern era and, to a lesser extent, 
from the years 1870 to 1962.
x
 Sources are nonetheless abundant and such practical 
difficulties not insurmountable. At least four other factors, political and intellectual, 
probably played a more important role. First comes political mythology, with republican 
historians keen on portraying the Revolution as a watershed that found its natural 
conclusion with the establishment of the Third Republic. François Furet and Pierre 
Rosanvallon, among others, have demolished this teleological conception of nineteenth-
century French political history, which viewed the successive monarchical — légitimiste, 
orléaniste and bonapartist — restorations of the years 1814–70 as anomalies or mere 
stages towards the advent of a republican democracy. A similar republican teleology 
informed the history of French colonization. Moderate republican historians such as 
Gabriel Hanotaux or Georges Hardy often decried the errors of colonial policy made by 
the nineteenth-century monarchies or at most acknowledged their minor territorial 
contribution to the edification of the republic‘s empire. Only more conservative scholars 
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such as Schefer or Henri Blet sympathetically analysed the period‘s colonial ideas and 
enterprises.
xi
  
A second cause of oblivion is the deep imprint of the Napoleonic continental model 
of empire, at the expense of overseas expansion, in French culture. Still today in French, 
‗l‘empire‘ refers to the First Napoleonic Empire. To discuss ‗empire‘ in the British sense, 
one ought to speak of ‗les colonies‘ or ‗l‘empire colonial‘. Decolonization and European 
integration since the 1950s have reinforced the dominance of this continental conception 
of imperialism and the decline of colonial history in French universities. A third, loosely 
related factor is the focus on nation-state and class formation, common to a great deal of 
nineteenth-century European history, but compounded in the French case by the 
historiographical obsession with the causes and consequences of the Revolution, one of 
the last bastions of resistance to the rise of global and transnational history.
xii
 This focus 
has further relegated colonial issues to the periphery of French history between 1770 and 
1870.
xiii
  
The fourth, probably decisive factor is the small territorial extent of French colonial 
possessions between 1800 and 1880. Yet it only operates because historians of French 
imperialism have failed to take into consideration the concept of ‗informal empire‘ and 
— to adapt the British expression — what was not ‗blue on the map‘. In other words, 
there were no French equivalents to John Gallagher and Ronald Robinson, whose 
controversial ideas breathed new life into British imperial history after 1950. Gallagher 
and Robinson‘s thesis on the ‗imperialism of free trade‘ stated that even after mercantilist 
methods of exploitation were abandoned in the mid-nineteenth century, Britain continued 
to seek imperial expansion, by informal means if possible and by formal annexation only 
5 
 
 
 
when necessary. Such an outlook opened new avenues of research into the global spread 
of British influence.
xiv
 The study of all periods of French imperial history has suffered 
from this neglect of the informal dimension of empire, but none has suffered more than 
the years 1814 to 1870, when French territorial expansion was at its lowest ebb.  
Despite the reduction of her naval and military capability at Trafalgar and Waterloo, 
France remained a major economic power, ranking second only to Britain for the size of 
foreign trade and foreign investments. She was still well endowed with intellectual and 
cultural influence. Her academic institutions and engineering schools, inherited from the 
Ancien Régime (Collège de France, Muséum d‘histoire naturelle, École des Mines and 
École des Ponts) or created by the Revolution (École Polytechnique, École normale 
supérieure, Conservatoire des Arts et Métiers), enjoyed immense global prestige. The 
French language, especially in continental Europe and throughout the Mediterranean 
world, preserved its status as the main medium of intellectual, scientific, and even 
commercial and financial communications.
xv
 Egypt, for example, could be viewed as a 
cultural and economic French colony for much of the nineteenth century, even after the 
establishment of a British protectorate in 1882.
xvi
   
Taking into consideration informal imperial expansion should not lead to 
abandoning the history of formal colonies, which often served as crucial relays for the 
spread of economic or ideological influence. But such an investigation requires a shift of 
emphasis from traditional political history and diplomatic tussles over territorial 
acquisitions to intellectual and legal history and the evolution of French ideas about 
global expansion, colonial institutions and other means of exploiting overseas territories. 
Retracing the connections between France‘s first and second colonial empires should also 
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rely on a more careful examination of the thousands of individuals who promoted or 
carried out projects of overseas expansion, a group which encompassed merchants, civil 
servants and even customs agents as well as prominent intellectuals. As several examples 
in the next two sections will illustrate, these agents of French expansionism frequently 
circulated between old and new French colonial possessions, as did administrative and 
economic practices.  
Such a reappraisal of France‘s role as an imperial power in the years 1814 to 1870 
has important implications for the study of other empires and, in particular, of British 
imperialism in the nineteenth century. The British empire towered high above all the 
others after 1815. But it is possible to use the case of France, the second most dynamic 
imperial power after Britain, to call into question at least two widely held assumptions 
about the singularity of the British empire and its relations with other European powers 
overseas. Firstly, the most popular paradigms devised to conceptualize the chronology 
and the methods of British expansion, such as ‗free trade imperialism‘ or ‗gentlemanly 
capitalism‘, are implicitly understood to apply exclusively to Britain. With some minor 
adjustments, such paradigms may help to explain the pace and ways of other European 
imperialisms: for example, the third section of this article suggests that there also was a 
French ‗imperialism of free trade‘ between 1850 and 1870, which incorporated some 
features of ‗gentlemanly capitalism‘. Secondly, an intriguing aspect of post-1815 
European expansionism is the absence of major armed conflicts over colonial issues 
between European powers, which stands in sharp contrast with the recurrent mercantilist 
wars of the early modern era. Richard Drayton has emphasized the often underestimated 
level of transnational cooperation between members of European civil societies as they 
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conquered and exploited extra-European possessions in the early modern period, for 
instance between European settlers in the Caribbean islands.
xvii
 After 1815, such 
cooperation between Europeans intensified and reached the level of interstate politics.  
Relations between the French and British empires in the nineteenth century are a 
case in point. Tensions undeniably persisted between the two powers. Existing works 
dwell at length on the numerous overseas crises that supposedly brought the two 
countries to the brink of war, from the diplomatic struggle over Muhammad Ali‘s Egypt 
in 1840 to the Fashoda standoff in Sudan in 1898. Yet the most remarkable feature of this 
enduring rivalry is that unlike colonial competition in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries, it never erupted into war. Britain and France fought several overseas wars in 
the nineteenth century, but always in alliance and as the joint representatives of ‗western‘ 
civilization against ‗barbarian‘ Orientals or to restore order in the unstable new republics 
of Latin America: the 1827 war to liberate Greece, with Russian support, from Turkish 
rule; the 1845–7 intervention to prevent the annexation of Uruguay by Argentina; the 
Crimean War of 1853–6 to defend the Ottoman Empire against Russian ambitions; the 
Arrow or Second Opium War of 1856–60, which resulted in the definitive opening of 
China to western trade and missionaries; and the 1862 expedition, also with a Spanish 
contingent, to force Mexico to fulfil its obligations to European creditors. It is apt that 
this tradition of joint imperial military ventures ended, together with modern colonial 
empires, at Suez in 1956. 
Imperial competition between Britain and France can therefore be re-interpreted as 
a form of cooperative emulation, which enabled both countries to accentuate their 
technological military lead and political dominance over extra-European nations. The 
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naval arms race of the years 1840–70, for example, accelerated the adoption of steam and 
iron-armouring by both navies.
xviii
 It led not to a Franco-British conflict, but to a tacit and 
unequal condominium over world seas in the 1860s. Such a condominium remained 
unequal because it crucially relied on the new acceptance by the French elite that if 
France wanted to participate in western expansion, it would now have to be in a 
subordinate position. Trust-building between the two countries‘ elites was a gradual and 
uneven process, which derived from a succession of opportunities overseas rather than a 
deliberate grand plan. Yet as early as 1814 Henri de Saint-Simon, the utopian thinker, 
proposed the creation of a Franco-British parliament in which Britons would be 
guaranteed the majority of representatives, in return for letting France share Britain‘s 
privileged position ‗in its relations with the rest of the world‘. In 1823, Dominique de 
Pradt, a widely read analyst of international affairs, called on his countrymen to admit 
that France was no longer able to compete single-handedly for global dominance. Instead, 
he argued, France should forge an alliance with Britain to promote ‗liberal principles‘ on 
a global scale and prevent the expansion of Russian military despotism: ‗The only liberty 
left [to France] lies in the choice of a necessary protector.‘xix  
Frustration with France‘s diminished status caused occasional lapses into the old 
model of confrontation, as in 1840 or 1898. But on each occasion, realism prevailed and 
France backed down: in return, she obtained a limited right of action and expansion 
overseas. By 1881, Lord Salisbury, then foreign secretary, referred to France in his 
private correspondence as Britain‘s ‗faithful ally‘.xx Although strained by the partition of 
Africa in the 1880s and 1890s, cooperation was restored by the 1904 Entente Cordiale 
agreement, usually cited as an act of European diplomacy designed to contain German 
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ambitions, but whose official and far from perfunctory purpose was the solving of 
territorial and commercial disputes overseas. This view contrasts with the emphasis 
placed by many historians on the intensity of Anglophobia in nineteenth-century France. 
Yet, as has been shown for the eighteenth century, the rise of mutually xenophobic public 
discourses between Britain and France did not necessary reflect the actual feelings of 
policy-makers or populations. Furthermore, Anglophilia, or Anglomanie in contemporary 
French political parlance, was widespread among the elite. François Guizot and Napoleon 
III, who together conducted French foreign policy almost uninterruptedly from 1840 until 
1870, were fervent admirers of Britain and staunch supporters of a Franco-British 
alliance.
xxi
  
Such imperial cooperation can also be construed as collaboration. The model of an 
empire by collaboration, relying on indigenous rulers in formal and informal colonies, 
may be extended to the European continent, where some countries such as France, 
Portugal or the Netherlands were granted the dignity of junior partners in imperial 
expansion. Thus the system of the British empire comprised not only territorial 
possessions and informal dependencies, but also auxiliaries such as the French empire.  
 
II 
British global hegemony after the Napoleonic wars transformed French imperial 
ambitions more profoundly than the domestic ideological turmoil of the Revolutionary 
era. Shunning earlier projects of more liberal forms of colonization, the Restoration 
sought to resurrect predatory methods of imperial exploitation and adjust them to the 
limiting conditions of a British-dominated world. The July Monarchy proved in the main 
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content with ensuring the survival of the resuscitated old colonial system, although it 
initiated a policy of collaboration with Britain with regard to issues such as the repression 
of the slave trade. 
Reaction in the French colonies arguably began under the Consulate, which re-
established slavery in 1802. But the loss of all French territories overseas to Britain after 
the resumption of maritime warfare in 1803 and Haitian independence in 1804 thwarted 
Napoleon‘s projects.xxii It was only during the lasting peace that followed the Congress of 
Vienna that France was able to undertake a sustained effort to restore the pre-
Revolutionary state of affairs in her colonies. In contrast to historians who often describe 
the colonial dimension of the Vienna settlement as having sanctioned the liquidation of 
the Bourbon empire, contemporaries viewed it, by comparison with the colonial clauses 
of the 1763 Paris peace treaty, as generous. Britain returned to France all her tropical 
colonies except Mauritius but including its Senegalese comptoirs of Gorée and Saint-
Louis, in addition to Martinique, Guadeloupe, Guyana, Bourbon and her Indian 
comptoirs. The 1814 peace treaty also recognized French sovereignty over Saint-
Domingue and Britain secretly pledged not to hinder France‘s future attempts to restore 
effective control over the island.
xxiii
 
This secret article testified to the regime‘s determination to restore the old order, a 
proclivity perhaps even more pronounced in the colonies than in metropolitan France. 
The Restoration‘s first minister of the navy and colonies was Pierre Victor Malouet, a 
former senior administrator of Saint-Domingue, intendant of French Guyana, and staunch 
defender of the slave trade and racial discrimination at the Constituent Assembly in 
1789–91.xxiv In his four months as minister until his death on 7 September 1814, Malouet 
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pursued a policy of arch-reaction. His instructions to the newly appointed gouverneurs 
and intendants (these old regime positions were resuscitated, even as the Restoration 
maintained the Napoleonic préfets in metropolitan France) of the recovered colonies 
comprised the reinstatement of discriminations against free coloured individuals and of 
the ‗mitigated‘ version of the Exclusif adopted in 1784, which still banned most 
commercial relations between the colonies and foreign countries. Malouet also 
commissioned three agents — one white, one mixed-race, and one black — to sound out 
Haitian leaders about the restoration of French sovereignty over the former ‗pearl of the 
Antilles‘. Malouet‘s death did not alter the course of the Restoration‘s policy. On 10 
October 1814, the new gouverneur and intendant of the Indian Ocean colony Île Bourbon 
were instructed ‗to uphold severely the prohibitive regime‘ of commercial relations.xxv  
The disastrous outcome of the Hundred Days resulted in several setbacks. Firstly, 
the heavy indemnity imposed upon France at the 1815 peace treaty forced the Bourbons 
to rescind plans for a new military expedition to Saint-Domingue, a decision 
compounded by the arrest and expulsion of the three agents sent to the island.
xxvi
 
Secondly, Napoleon‘s decision to abolish the slave trade on 29 March 1815, in the hope 
of bolstering support amongst liberals at home and reducing British hostility to his return 
to power, called into question the provision of the 1814 peace treaty that authorized 
France to resume slave trading operations for five years. Under British pressure, the 
Bourbon government confirmed the act of abolition. Yet it pursued a policy of active 
tolerance, requesting metropolitan port authorities and colonial governors to turn a blind 
eye to slave trading.
xxvii
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Under the premiership of Joseph de Villèle from 1821 to 1828, colonial reaction 
intensified. Villèle spent most of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic period in Bourbon, 
where he married into the local créole aristocracy and became a leading opponent of the 
abolition of slavery. His ascendancy marked the high tide of reaction in metropolitan 
politics, but Villèle also took extraordinary measures in the colonies, including a partial 
handover of the local administration to planters and steep increases in the import duties 
on foreign sugar, which effectively reserved the domestic market for French colonial 
sugar. Reaction is never a mere return to the previous state of affairs: in the colonies 
under Villèle, it offered planters more than they had ever received under the Ancien 
Régime.
xxviii
  
Colonial reaction met with some notable successes. Trade with the remaining 
French colonies soared. Existing works offer abundant statistics about the prosperous 
colonial trade of the late eighteenth century and the more modest yet significant 
contribution of colonial markets to French external trade after 1880. Figure 1 examines 
the evolution of the proportion of French imports that were drawn from the French 
colonies, from the end of the First Napoleonic Empire until the mid-1890s. It is based on 
three different series of administrative unpublished and published figures, but the 
divergences observed when the series overlap (in 1821–9 and 1847–56) do not call orders 
of magnitude into question. The share of colonial imports in all French imports rose from 
almost nothing in 1815 to 20% in 1820, while the tariffs introduced by Villèle in 1822 
and 1826 reversed the downward trend of the early 1820s, with an average of nearly 15% 
over the decade. Given the exiguity of the contemporary French colonial demesne, such 
figures are startling. They sustain the comparison with the 30% share of colonial imports 
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in total French imports before 1789, while the 15% threshold would not be reached again 
until the official adoption of a policy of imperial autarchy during the Depression of the 
1930s.
xxix
 
 
 
Figure 1: Share of colonial imports in total French imports, 1810–1896 (in %) 
Sources: Archives Nationales, Paris (hereafter AN), F12 251, ‗balance du commerce‘ and ‗tableaux‘ for 
series 1; Direction générale des douanes, Tableau décennal du commerce de la France avec ses colonies et 
les puissances étrangères, 7 vols. (Paris, 1838–98), ‗provenance et destination‘, for series 2 and 3.  
 
Figures about the French slave trade under the Restoration are equally remarkable. 
Available estimates put the number of African slaves transported by French ships to the 
West Indies at 137,000 in the years 1821–1830. This figure almost matches the average 
French transatlantic slave trade of the years 1761–1780 (143,000 per decade) and made 
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France the second slave-trading European nation of the 1820s, although still far behind 
Portugal.
xxx
 Not all the slaves were disembarked on the French islands, as many were 
probably destined to Cuba. Yet the plantation system experienced a genuine revival of 
prosperity in Martinique, Guadeloupe and Bourbon: by 1826, the three islands exported 
together the same amount of sugar — 69 million tons — as Saint-Domingue before the 
Revolution.
xxxi
 
Historians have paid little attention to this revival. In addition to the general causes 
of lack of interest in French imperial issues between 1814 and 1870, this may be due to 
the absence of a mass movement against slavery comparable to the one that agitated 
British public opinion at the time.
xxxii
 Yet it is a conceptual fallacy to presume that 
opinions about slavery would express themselves similarly in different cultural contexts. 
British abolitionism was closely tied to the evangelical revival of the late eighteenth and 
early nineteenth centuries. In France, which was both Catholic and more secularized, 
hostility to slavery found other, more diffuse channels of expression. Contemporary 
debates about naval policy, colonial tariffs or the fundamental rights guaranteed by the 
constitutional Charter of 1814 teemed with references to the legitimacy or abhorrent 
character of the institution.  
Thus the sensation caused by the Raft of the Medusa at the 1819 official painting 
Salon did not only result from Théodore Géricault‘s artistic audacity. When she ran 
aground a sandbank off the West African Coast in 1816, the Medusa was transporting 
French troops and administrators to reinstate French rule in Senegal. Between 1816 and 
1819, several surviving participants in the expedition became embroiled in slave-trading 
scandals. These included Julien Schmaltz, a former Lorient merchant and administrator in 
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the Dutch East Indies, who was appointed governor of Senegal and introduced new 
systems of semi-coerced labour in the Senegalese hinterland. Géricault went on to 
prepare what would have been a major anti-slavery painting, the African Slave Trade, if 
he had completed it before his death in 1824.
xxxiii
 Another major scandal was the arbitrary 
imprisonment and deportation of a dozen free men of colour in Martinique, suspected of 
involvement in the 1822 slave rebellion on the island and publication of an incendiary 
pamphlet, which denounced the flouting of the rights of free coloured individuals in the 
colonies.
xxxiv
 In this as in several other instances, orators of the liberal opposition such as 
Benjamin Constant pilloried the complicity of the government in the continuation of the 
slave trade and racial discrimination.
xxxv
 
Colonial reaction nonetheless met with a major failure with regard to the re-
establishment of French sovereignty over Saint-Domingue. The Bourbon monarchy only 
recognized the new Haitian Republic in 1825, in return for commercial privileges and an 
indemnity of 150 million francs. Memories of the 1802 expedition to re-conquer the 
island, which cost Bonaparte 50,000 of his best soldiers, played a part in the decision. But 
the long-delayed renunciation of one of the most prodigious sources of wealth under the 
Ancien Régime was also grounded in the realization that the international market in 
colonial goods had undergone a drastic change with the rise of Cuban competition and 
the emergence of new producers in Asia. As shown by the need to introduce protective 
tariffs on colonial sugar, the French plantation economy was no longer competitive. The 
resuscitated Exclusif now functioned to the benefit of the colonies, and if re-conquered, 
Saint-Domingue would have become a fiscal burden.
xxxvi
 The recognition of Haitian 
independence nonetheless aroused loud and enduring protests from the royalist right.
xxxvii
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Nor did it bring hopes of obtaining a sufficiently large colony to satisfy French needs in 
tropical products to an end.  
The conquest of Algeria, in its initial stage, may thus be construed as an attempt to 
provide France with a substitute for the riches of Saint-Domingue rather than a new 
colonial departure. The Restoration fleetingly entertained projects of a new large 
plantation colony in Guyana, Senegal or Madagascar.
xxxviii
 Yet none met with substantial 
results and the Bourbon government turned its attention to North Africa, where the 
weakening of Turkish rule seemed to offer new possibilities. As early as 1825 and 
following the failure of an attempt to resuscitate the Compagnie d‘Afrique, a Colbertian 
monopoly for trade with Algiers abolished by the Revolution, a report from the ‗direction 
du Commerce extérieur‘ at the ministry of the interior envisaged the establishment of a 
‗régime colonial‘ in the Regency of Algiers: ‗new cessions of territory‘ and ‗new 
commercial privileges‘ would enable France to exploit ‗the largely uncultivated land, 
covered with a population that could easily be encouraged to work‘; such a colony would 
provide France with ‗a large number of productions from the two worlds‘.xxxix   
Even traditional scholars who eulogized colonization have tended to admit that the 
public humiliation of the French consul by the Dey of Algiers in 1827 was a pretext 
rather than a proximate cause for the seizure of Algiers on 5 July 1830.
xl
 Yet most have 
merely underlined, as a deeper motive, the search for military prestige abroad of a 
government embattled at home, and contended that the Restoration had no specific plans 
for the conquered territory. As a result of the overthrow of the Bourbons just four weeks 
after the fall of Algiers, an event partly triggered by liberal anxieties about the regime‘s 
imperial ambitions in Africa, it is impossible to determine the extent to which the 
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Restoration had the ambition of transforming Algeria into a new Saint-Domingue. 
However, the beginnings of French rule in Algeria under the July Monarchy reveal that 
there were deeper connections than has been traditionally assumed between the 
respective figureheads of the first and the second French colonial empire. The troubling 
resemblances between the fates of the two colonies may not have been entirely 
coincidental: both were intensely colonized and became major recipients of French 
investments, both underwent extremely violent revolutions, which helped to bring down 
the Bourbon monarchy in 1792 and the Fourth Republic in 1958, and both were subjected 
to extraordinary efforts of suppression in French official and private memory after 1825 
and 1962.
xli
 
Thus the first governor of French North Africa appointed by the July Monarchy was 
General Bertrand Clauzel, a Napoleonic soldier who had been governor of Le Cap, Saint-
Domingue‘s largest city, during the 1802 expedition and had married into the local créole 
aristocracy. Back in Europe, Clauzel served as a high-ranking administrator in Naples, 
Holland, Spain, Portugal and Dalmatia and, as a result of proscriptions after Waterloo, 
established himself as a farmer near La Mobile (modern Alabama) between 1815 and 
1820.
xlii
  His career therefore lay at the confluence of early modern, Napoleonic and 
modern French imperialism. In several pamphlets published in the 1830s, Clauzel used 
statistics on land productivity in the French West Indies and Louisiana to suggest that the 
Mitidja plain (south of Algiers) alone could provide Western Europe with most of the 
cotton, sugar and other colonial products that she required.
xliii
 Nor was Clauzel the only 
official in Algeria who had acquired colonial administrative experience in the Americas. 
Amédée Usquin, from Burgundy, served as a justice of the peace in Guadeloupe and 
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Martinique before becoming a ‗royal judge‘ at Oran (western Algeria), where he 
supervised the installation of a new courthouse in 1833–4. Forced to resign after a quarrel 
with the sous-intendant civil of Oran in September 1834, he was later appointed ‗first 
judge‘ at Chandernagor in India.xliv  
The policy of ‗occupation restreinte‘ pursued by France in its new African colony 
until 1840, whereby direct rule was confined to coastal cities and the surrounding plains, 
was reminiscent of the early stage of colonization in Saint-Domingue, where large parts 
of the interior of the island were left to maroon slaves. Mercantilist conceptions of 
economic exploitation continued to inspire the early years of French rule. The customs 
legislation introduced by Clauzel in 1835 reproduced almost word for word the milder 
version of the Exclusif he issued at Le Cap in 1802.
xlv
 The shift from slavery to free 
labour was also incomplete. Not only were the ownership of slaves by Muslim Algerians 
and the slave trade tolerated until around 1850, but large-scale land expropriations and 
fiscal privileges for European settlers aimed to turn indigenous Algerians into a cheap 
agricultural workforce.
xlvi
  
After Clauzel‘s final resignation in 1837, the poor results of experiments in tropical 
cultures and the worldwide glut in colonial goods gradually forced the French to 
encourage the cultivation of cereals and the vine. But the fear of competition for 
metropolitan producers delayed the lifting of restrictions on Algerian exports to France 
until the passage of a law in January 1851 and a decree in February 1860.
xlvii
 Another 
factor that thwarted French hopes of turning Algeria into a new Saint-Domingue was the 
constitution of a powerful Islamic state in Western and Central Algeria, under the 
leadership of Abd al-Qadir, who declared jihad on the French in 1839. Eight years and an 
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army of 100,000 soldiers proved necessary to vanquish Abd al-Qadir, and war forced the 
French to extend direct rule over the entire territory of the former Regency.
xlviii
   
Continuity also prevailed in the French islands, ensuring the survival of slavery 
until 1848. The July Monarchy embarked upon a forceful policy of repression against the 
slave trade, with the draconian law of 4 March 1831 and the controversial granting of the 
right to search French merchant ships to the Royal Navy in 1845. Three laws in April 
1833 also reduced the commercial privileges granted to producers of colonial sugar, 
reinforced the powers of colonial governors and the oversight of legislation by 
metropolitan authorities, and abolished civil and political discriminations against 
coloured citizens. Yet the new legislation confirmed the Exclusif, while a franchise twice 
as high as in metropolitan France enabled white planters to remain in control of local 
politics. Jean Filleau de Saint-Hilaire, director of the colonies at the ministry of the navy 
since 1825, retained his position until 1842. Hopes of a rapid slave emancipation quickly 
abated, as the economic results of emancipation in the British colonies seemed to 
disprove the abolitionists‘ theories about the superiority of free labour. By the mid-1840s, 
a number of French politicians began to reappraise the civilizing virtues of slavery and 
delegates from the French West Indies mounted a project for an international alliance for 
the global defence of slavery between France, Spain, the United States, and Brazil against 
the British-led global campaign for abolition. New legislation in 1845 relaxed a few 
commercial restrictions and improved the legal status of slaves.
xlix
 But supporters of such 
reforms often hoped to give a new lease of life to the Exclusif and slavery rather than 
embark on a profound transformation of French imperial policy.  
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III 
The revolution of February 1848 dealt a death blow to the reformed old colonial system, 
while the decay of the plantation economy and the abolition of slavery compelled French 
intellectuals and politicians to devise new conceptions of imperial expansion. The short-
lived colonial policies of the Second Republic yielded no significant result. But Louis-
Napoléon Bonaparte gradually embraced and forcefully implemented a policy of global 
expansion that privileged informal means of influence, or what might be described as a 
French imperialism of free trade. These changes also transformed French perceptions of 
British power, from a constraining factor to a potential partner for the establishment of 
European dominance overseas. 
 The second abolition of slavery partly resulted from demographic and economic 
constraints. The flight of slaves to the emancipated British islands accentuated fears of a 
long-term decline in the slave population of the French islands. More importantly, the 
rapid growth of a metropolitan beet sugar industry after 1830 provoked a steep fall in 
sugar prices on the metropolitan market and brought colonial plantations to the brink of 
ruin in the 1840s.
l
 Yet the proximate cause for abolition was the advent of the Second 
Republic. Underlining the danger of a slave revolt comparable to the one that devastated 
Saint-Domingue after the proclamation of the First Republic in 1792, a handful of radical 
abolitionists led by Victor Schoelcher obtained the adoption of a decree of immediate 
emancipation on 24 April 1848, although the emancipation of domestic slaves in Algeria 
and Senegal was carried out more gradually. The Second Republic pursued a colonial 
policy of ‗assimilation‘, extending parliamentary representation in Paris and male 
universal suffrage, with the notable exception of indigenous Algerians, to all French 
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overseas territories. It also encouraged metropolitan emigration to the colonies, with the 
twin objectives of reducing metropolitan unemployment and promoting a new kind of 
colonial development based on white labour, but a large-scale experiment in such state-
sponsored colonization met with disastrous failure in Algeria.
li
 
Only under the Second Napoleonic Empire and partly as a result of the direct 
influence of several Saint-Simonians on Napoleon III did France adopt new, ‗liberal‘ 
methods of imperial expansion. Recent scholarship in political theory has drawn a 
parallel between the leading role of Alexis de Tocqueville in the conversion of French 
liberals to imperial expansion and the impact of new justifications for imperial rule 
championed by James and John Stuart Mill in Britain.
lii
 Yet from the historian‘s 
standpoint, there is a dual danger of exaggerating Tocqueville‘s influence on French 
thinking about empire and the liberal character of his views on colonization. 
Tocqueville‘s writings on Algeria were not published until the twentieth century or were 
parliamentary reports, which attracted little contemporary attention and exercised no 
discernible influence on French colonial policy, in Algeria or elsewhere. Minutes from 
parliamentary committees on Algerian affairs, which record his personal interventions in 
legislative discussions, also cast doubt on his alleged liberalism: his main concern was 
the promotion of white immigration rather than improving the condition of indigenous 
Algerians and he opposed free trade even limited to Franco-Algerian intercourse.
liii
   
Mid-nineteenth-century French imperial liberalism probably owed more to the 
critique of mercantilist exploitation by economists such as Jean-Baptiste Say, who kept 
alive the physiocratic legacy during the Restoration.
liv
 But it was above all indebted to the 
keen interest of Saint-Simonians in the global expansion of western trade and industry 
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after 1830 and, more particularly among them, of Michel Chevalier, a leading figure of 
the movement.
lv
 As early as 1832 in the Système de la Méditerranée, Chevalier called on 
France and the west to turn their attention to Africa and Asia, which new technologies 
such as railroads and steamships and telegraphs would make easier to exploit. Following 
a two-year visit to the United States, Canada, Mexico and Cuba, his Lettres sur 
l‘Amérique du Nord (1836) lamented the loss of France‘s North American continental 
empire in 1763, highlighted the superiority of ‗Anglo-Saxon‘ methods of colonization 
over ‗Latin‘ (French, Spanish and Portuguese) approaches, and urged France to embrace 
economic reforms in order to resume overseas expansion as well as to increase domestic 
prosperity. It was France‘s duty, he wrote, ‗to awake [the Latin peoples] from the 
lethargy they have sunk into in both hemispheres, to raise them to the level of other 
nations, and to enable them to make a mark on the world‘. Despite this emphasis on 
rivalry between the Anglo-Saxon and Latin ‗races‘, Chevalier‘s conception of Western 
expansion was extremely cooperative: characteristically, his first letter on North America 
consisted in a proposal for a London-Paris railroad, which would form the material basis 
of a ‗close alliance‘ for the exploitation of global resources.lvi Not unlike British 
Utilitarians, French Saint-Simonians eschewed traditional European state rivalries in 
favour of a British or Franco-British-led endeavour by all ‗western‘ countries to improve 
the condition of ‗backward‘ races. 
The Lettres were serialized in the widely circulated Journal des débats and went 
through four editions and numerous reprints. Chevalier also had influential disciples, 
including Jules Duval, a correspondent of the Débats on Algerian affairs, and later editor-
in-chief of L‘Économiste français (1861–9), a semi-monthly publication that stalwartly 
23 
 
 
 
supported trade liberalization and overseas expansion. The first issue proclaimed that 
‗general colonization [was] the linchpin of political economy‘: it would make possible 
‗the exploitation of the entire globe, [which was] the permanent aspiration and supreme 
goal of mankind [and] an infinite source of works, products, exchanges, emulation and 
wealth‘. Duval‘s conception of ‗colonization‘ encompassed ‗rayonnement pacifique‘ as 
well as territorial dominion.
lvii
  
The ideas of Chevalier and his allies reached their maximum influence under the 
Second Napoleonic Empire. Historians have sometimes derided this regime‘s claim to 
imperium, contrasting it with the more substantial territorial conquests of Napoleon I in 
continental Europe — a tradition inaugurated by Victor Hugo, who ridiculed the first 
emperor‘s nephew as a ‗white Soulouque‘, drawing an interesting parallel with Faustin 
Soulouque, president of the Haitian republic who crowned himself emperor in 1849.
lviii
 
But if the globe rather than Europe is selected as the scale of imperial expansion and if 
areas of informal influence are taken into consideration, the Second Napoleonic Empire 
appears as the most determined attempt to restore French global power since the War of 
American Independence.
lix
 As professor of political economy at the Collège de France 
since 1840, a dominant figure in the section of the Conseil d‘État in charge of economic 
legislation after 1852 and life-member of the imperial Senate after 1860, Chevalier 
proved a major proponent and artisan of these new global designs.  
Free trade imperialism ultimately relied on hard power, especially sea power, and 
the Second Empire soon launched an unprecedented programme of naval construction. 
French engineers took the lead in the steam and iron-armouring technological revolutions 
and the French Navy‘s budget trebled between 1850 and 1865, when it reached nearly 
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two thirds of British naval expenditure.
lx
 The rapid narrowing of the naval gap elicited 
anxiety in London and the British press, but later developments showed that Napoleon III 
wished to turn France into a serious partner for the exploitation of global resources rather 
than avenge Trafalgar. The main guarantee of cooperation he offered Britain was the 
1860 commercial or ‗free trade‘ treaty between the two countries. Although it continues 
to be referred to as the Cobden treaty, research has proved that its main instigator was 
Chevalier.
lxi
 The latter also steered the abolition of the colonial Exclusif through the 
Senate in 1861.
lxii
 Chevalier‘s support for free trade owed little to Ricardian political 
economy or Cobdenite utopianism. In his lectures at the Collège de France, he advocated 
government intervention to encourage the construction of infrastructure and the 
expansion of credit. But after the embrace of free trade by Britain in 1846–9, he became 
convinced that commercial openness would foster economic growth and facilitate the 
expansion of French influence throughout the world: the decay of Chinese power, he 
contended, illustrated ‗the lot reserved to the nations that isolate themselves‘.lxiii  
Partly as a result of the Second Empire‘s commercial policies, French foreign trade 
soared. Between 1850 and 1870, exports trebled in value (see figure 2) and the 
exports/GDP ratio doubled, from 6 to 12%. The share of French exports in world exports 
rose from less than 10% in 1850 to nearly 15% in the mid-1860s. Instead of cotton 
textiles, coal and hardware, France exported silks, wines and luxury ‗articles de Paris‘. 
But as with its British contemporary, French economic imperialism had a financial as 
well as a commercial dimension. The net value of French foreign investments augmented 
from 0.75 billion francs in 1850 to 13.3 billion in 1870. French capital and French 
engineers played a leading role in the construction of infrastructure in Eastern Europe and 
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throughout the Mediterranean. The cutting of the Suez Canal, between 1858 and 1869, is 
the most famous such French-led, cooperative and financial imperial venture. French 
global financial power relied on the new joint-stock banks modelled on the Crédit 
Mobilier, founded in 1852, and France‘s continuing adhesion to a bimetallic standard. 
Bimetallism made Paris an essential intermediary between Britain and the handful of 
countries that had adopted a gold standard on the one hand, and the vast majority of the 
world, especially Asia and including British India, which remained on a silver standard, 
on the other.
lxiv
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 In accordance with the paradigm of free trade imperialism, the Second Empire only 
reluctantly resorted to territorial expansion. Furthermore, the territories acquired in 
Western Africa (Senegalese hinterland) and East Asia (Cochinchina) were not destined to 
become mercantilist plantations, but areas where France would exercise a benevolent and 
non-exclusive patronage.
lxv
 The Comte de Chausseloup-Laubat, minister of the navy, 
explained to the governor of Cochinchina in 1862: ‗It is a sort of suzerainty, of 
sovereignty that we want, with free commercial intercourse, accessible to all ... We do 
not wish to found a colony in the sense given to this word by our fathers, with European 
settlers, institutions, regulations, and privileges; no, it is a veritable empire that we must 
create‘.lxvi The Second Empire favoured commercial treaties as a means to propagate 
French influence, not only with Britain and eleven other European countries in 1860–6, 
but also with Siam in 1856, Japan and China in 1858, and Madagascar in 1862.
lxvii
 The 
Reception of the Siamese Ambassadors (1861) by Jean-Léon Gérôme, an official painter 
who specialized in Orientalist subjects, depicted the ratification of the treaty with Siam 
with a pomposity that highlighted the restoration of French global imperial grandeur by 
commercial means.
lxviii
 
Near the centre of Gérôme‘s painting figures a Jesuit priest, the Abbé Lanardie, 
who played a key role in the negotiation of the treaty with Siam in 1858.
lxix
 This presence 
illustrates an important feature of French free trade imperialism after 1850: its close 
association with the global promotion of Catholicism. Chevalier viewed Catholicism as 
the essentially Latin branch of Christianity and as the main source of legitimacy for the 
expansion of French influence throughout the world.
lxx
 Reconciliation between the 
modern French state and the Catholic Church was one of the central planks of the 
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bonpartist regime.
lxxi
 Partly as a result, French Catholic missionary zeal underwent 
unprecedented growth between 1850 and 1870: the Oeuvre de la propagation de la foi, 
founded in 1822, reached a million subscribers, while numerous new organizations were 
created, such as the Missions africaines and the Pères blancs. Hélène de Chappotin, the 
daugher of Saint-Domingue planters, proved a major figure of French missionary 
renaissance: after joining a mission affiliated with the Jesuits in India in 1864, she 
founded the Franciscaines missionnaires de Marie, an elite order with branches in 
Ceylon, China, Chile, Canada, Congo and Tunisia. By the late nineteenth century, two 
thirds of the 75,000 European Catholic priests, brothers and nuns working in missions 
overseas were French.
lxxii
 The defence of missionaries, Catholic believers or Catholic 
nations served as official justifications for French military involvement in the Crimean 
War in 1853, in China in 1856, Cochinchina in 1858, Lebanon in 1860, and Mexico in 
1862.
lxxiii
 
The paradigm of free trade imperialism may also be used to explain two major 
imperial ventures under Napoleon III: the attempt to transform Algeria into an ‗Arab 
kingdom‘ after 1861 and the expedition to install Maximilian of Habsburg as Emperor of 
Mexico between 1862 and 1867. Historians of Algeria often describe the policy of the 
Arab kingdom as a missed opportunity to pursue a policy of cooperative colonization 
between European settlers and indigenous Algerians. Napoleon III put a halt to land-
grabbing by European settlers, trying to confine the latter to industrial and commercial 
activities, and improved the legal status of indigenous Jews and Muslims.
lxxiv
 An 
influential advisor of the emperor on Algerian affairs and stalwart supporter of the Arab 
Kingdom was Ismayl (born Thomas) Urbain, who offers another extraordinary instance 
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of the transversal circulation of imperial ideas between the first and second colonial 
empires, from French Guyana to Algeria via Cairo.
lxxv
 However, existing works tend to 
romanticize Urbain‘s ‗Arabophile‘ policies, which sought to achieve, by more subtle 
means, the same goals as his ‗assimilationist‘ opponents: the breaking down of collective 
tribal property and the imposition of new capitalist structures of production on Algerian 
society.  
The exact motives of the Mexican expedition are controversial among historians, 
who have alternately placed an emphasis on several non-mutually exclusive explanations: 
France‘s desire to check American expansionism in Central America, the hopes of French 
financiers to take control of Mexican silver mines, and the ambition of Napoleon III to 
establish peace and stability on a global as well as a European scale.
lxxvi
 Yet one of the 
most compelling contemporary justifications was the case made by Chevalier from 1850 
onwards for the establishment of a progressive Mexican monarchy: while ‗Anglo-Saxon‘ 
and ‗Protestant‘ republicanism had plunged Spanish America into chaos since the 1820s, 
a monarchical regime committed to free trade and under French protection would better 
suit Mexico‘s ‗Latin‘ and ‗Catholic‘ temperament and enable the country to exploit its 
potentially enormous mineral and commercial wealth. The Mexican example would 
reverberate across ‗Latin America‘ — an expression probably forged by Chevalier — and 
enhance French influence in the old as well as in the new world. Chevalier therefore 
warmly approved of the crowning of Maximilian as Emperor of Mexico in 1864 and the 
sending of 30,000 French troops to bolster his fledging regime: ‗Among the diverse 
interests and duties of French politics, none is greater and more immediate than 
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upholding and fostering the power of the Latin group, the vanguard of Catholic 
nations‘.lxxvii  
The most polished theoretical exposition of this French imperialism of free trade 
was Paul Leroy-Beaulieu‘s De la Colonisation chez les peuples modernes. The book‘s 
first edition came out in 1874 and is often mistaken as a blueprint for the Third 
Republic‘s policy of colonial expansion. Yet the text was written in the last years of the 
Second Empire as an essay that won, in March 1870, the first prize of a concours on 
political economy organized by the Académie des Sciences Morales et Politiques in 
1866. Leroy-Beaulieu‘s book eulogized European expansion and British liberal methods 
of economic exploitation. It drew extensively on the writings of British ‗free trade 
imperialists‘ such as Herman Merivale, Robert Torrens and Edward Wakefield, but also 
on those of Duval and Chevalier, whose daughter, Cordelia, Leroy-Beaulieu married in 
May 1870.
lxxviii
 Leroy-Beaulieu placed an emphasis on informal means of colonization, 
defining the latter concept as ‗the subjection of the universe or a vast part of it to [a 
nation‘s] language, mœurs, ideas, and laws‘. Only in the significantly altered second 
edition of De la Colonisation, published in 1882, did Leroy-Beaulieu begin to advocate 
territorial expansion.
lxxix
  
Three successive setbacks destabilized French free trade imperialism after 1865. 
The great Algerian famine of 1866–8, which caused the death of approximately 20% of 
the indigenous population, was attributed by European settlers and their republican 
metropolitan allies to the Emperor‘s Arabophile policies and discredited the concept of an 
Arab kingdom.
lxxx
 The virulence of anti-French guerilla activity and the threat of 
American intervention after the end of the Civil War also forced Napoleon III to 
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withdraw French troops from Mexico, a decision which led to the overthrow and 
execution of Maximilian, a major humiliation for the bonapartist regime in 1867. But the 
decisive blow was dealt by the catastrophic outcome of the Franco-Prussian war in the 
summer of 1870, which triggered revolutionary insurrections in Algiers as well as Paris 
and the establishment of a republican regime in metropolitan France between 1870 and 
1877.
lxxxi
   
The decade of recueillement that followed the fall of Napoleon III witnessed a 
decline in French initiatives overseas, and even the abandonment of several comptoirs 
and protectorates in sub-Saharan Africa. But once firmly entrenched, the Third Republic 
resumed colonial expansion on a scale unprecedented since the days of Louis XIV. The 
colonies consolidated under the Second Empire such as Algeria and Senegal or the new 
colony of Cochinchina served as bridgeheads for massive territorial acquisitions in Africa 
and Indochina after 1880. Despite the new regime‘s difficult relations with the Catholic 
Church, republican leaders had no qualms using the existing network of missionaries to 
propound French influence or justify annexations overseas: ‗anticlericalism‘, Léon 
Gambetta declared, ‗[was] not an item for export‘. Yet as it developed, the imperialism of 
the Third Republic diverged in several fundamental ways from the empire imagined by 
Napoleon III and his Saint-Simonian advisors. France gradually reverted to domestic and 
imperial protectionism after 1872, and abandoned the bimetallic standard in 1873. The 
fear of Germany held in check the traditional Anglophobia of republicans, but the British 
empire now served as an anti-model as well as a source of emulation. The new emphasis 
on territorial conquest and the ‗assimilationist‘ rhetoric of the mission civilisatrice were 
frequently contrasted with the supposed British reliance on indirect rule and exploitative 
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conception of colonization. Even support for Catholic missions dwindled as 
anticlericalism entered a more radical phase in the wake of the Dreyfus affair in the 
1890s and with the separation of church and state in 1905.
lxxxii
 Elements of continuity 
persisted, but general histories underestimate the extent to which the advent of the Third 
Republic profoundly reshaped the nature of French imperialism, with consequences 
lasting until the collapse, partly resulting from the imperial setbacks of Dien Bien Phu, 
Suez, and the Algerian revolution, of the Fourth Republic in 1958.  
 
IV 
Territories, actors and memories from the eighteenth-century Bourbon empire played a 
key role in the reformulation of French imperial ambitions after 1814, although the route 
to the re-emergence of France as a major colonial power proved a sinuous process rather 
than a gradual transition. The high level of interaction between French metropolitan and 
extra-European events also suggests that despite the exiguity of French colonial 
possessions between 1814 and 1870, imperial ambitions and disappointments contributed 
in no small measure to the domestic political instability that characterized post-
Revolutionary France until the 1870s: the seizure of Algiers in 1830, the economic decay 
of the French West Indies in the 1840s, imperial chaos after 1848, and the disastrous 
outcome of the Arab Kingdom policy and Mexican expedition in the 1860s played a 
significant role in the respective demises of the Bourbon Restoration, July Monarchy, 
Second Republic and Second Napoleonic Empire. Further research on the French 
imperial meridian may therefore cast new light on the making of modern France as well 
as French imperial reconstruction.  
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An in-depth analysis of how Britain came to tolerate a restrained form of French 
overseas expansionism and of how France grudgingly came to accept a relatively 
subordinate status may also lead to a significant revision of the history of European 
imperialism in the nineteenth century. It was not only superior military and economic 
power, or the crises undergone by Asian and African states, but also the increasing 
capacity of European states to collaborate between themselves that explain the 
acceleration of European formal and informal expansion after 1815. This trend was 
sustained by the growing popularity of political and economic liberalism and, especially 
in British Utilitarian and French Saint-Simonian circles, of the concept of ‗the west‘. In 
contrast to early modern mercantilist conflicts and the resumption of imperial clashes 
from the 1890s onwards, such collaboration stands as one of the most salient features of 
‗liberal imperialism‘ in the nineteenth century. 
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